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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal Realism has undergone a revitalization in academia. In a series
of articles over the past decade and a half,1 and in a 2007 book,2 Brian
Leiter has offered a “philosophical reconstruction” of Legal Realism.3
That this reconstruction is necessary is itself remarkable in that Legal
Realism has been a dominant force in judicial decisionmaking for at least
the past half century, as seen, for example, in the landmark tort decisions
of the California Supreme Court,4 the most influential state supreme
court in the nation.5 Among legal philosophers, however, a misunderstood
Legal Realism has been an object of scorn, thought by many to be best

1. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50 (Martin P. Golding & William A.
Edmundson eds., 2005) [hereinafter Leiter, American Legal Realism]; Brian Leiter,
Classical Realism, 35 NOÛS 244 (2001) [hereinafter Leiter, Classical Realism]; Brian
Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261
(Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) [hereinafter Leiter, Legal Realism]; Brian Leiter, Positivism,
Formalism, and Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138 (1999) [hereinafter Leiter, Positivism]
(reviewing A NTHONY S EBOK , L EGAL P OSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
(1998)); Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence,
76 TEX. L. REV. 267 (1997) [hereinafter Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism].
2. BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007).
3. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 275.
4. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 567–68 (Cal. 1968) (abolishing
traditional landowner rules); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900–01
(Cal. 1963) (adopting strict products liability). See generally Edmund Ursin, How Great
Judges Think: Judges Richard Posner, Henry Friendly, and Roger Traynor on Judicial
Lawmaking, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1267 (2009).
5. Measured by decisions that have been “followed,” as that term is employed by
Shepard’s Citations Service, “over the course of several decades, the California Supreme
Court has been the most followed state high court, and that trend continues.” Jake Dear
& Edward W. Jessen, “Followed Rates” and the Leading State Cases, 1940–2005,
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683, 710 (2007). Six of the seven most followed decisions are tort
decisions rendered since 1960. See id. at 708–09.
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forgotten.6 So, in a sense, Leiter is offering academics, and especially
legal philosophers, the opportunity to learn something about American
law as it exists in the real world, as opposed to the colloquia of
academia.
Examining this reconstructed Legal Realism through the lens of the
tort scholarship of Leon Green and Karl Llewellyn, two giants in
American law, this Article adds an important (normative) dimension,
which is missing in Leiter’s otherwise illuminating analysis.7
In articulating what he sees as the descriptive and normative aspects of
Legal Realism, Leiter draws most of his examples from the field of
commercial law, which was the main focus of Llewellyn’s scholarship.8
He writes that most Legal Realists made a descriptive claim about
judicial decisions or, more specifically, decisions of appellate courts.
Stated in its most succinct form, this descriptive claim was that judicial
decisions fall into discernable patterns, correlated with the underlying
factual scenarios of disputes, or “situation types,” as opposed to formal
legal rules.9 As we will see, the tort scholarship of both Green and
Llewellyn confirms this thesis.
On the normative front, Leiter writes that most Legal Realists, including
Llewellyn, were “quietists.” Some quietists believed that because an
irremediable fact about judging is that judges respond to fact situations,
“it makes no sense to give normative advice.”10 “A more subtle version
of quietism,” linked to Llewellyn and Holmes, would have Legal Realists
“call[] for judges to do explicitly (and perhaps more successfully, as a

6.
7.

Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 270.
This Article primarily focuses on three seminal works: KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES (1930); Leon Green, The Duty Problem in
Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929) [hereinafter Green, The Duty
Problem: II]; Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L.
REV. 699 (1936). For a more elaborate discussion of Green’s and Llewellyn’s
scholarship, see VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE
LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 30–37, 71–87
(1995), and Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Dean Leon Green and Enterprise (NoFault) Liability: Origins, Strategies, and Prospects, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 91 (2001).
It should be noted that, in response to Francis Bohlen’s having labeled him a “legal
realist” and then—in Green’s view—having distorted his scholarship, Green wrote,
“I subscribe to no label . . . . I have never used the word ‘realism’ in my writings, and
while I have no prejudice against it, I do not know what it means.” Leon Green,
Innocent Misrepresentation, 19 VA. L. REV. 242, 247 (1933).
8. See generally LLEWELLYN, supra note 7.
9. Leiter, Positivism, supra note 1, at 1148.
10. Leiter, Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 277.
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consequence) what they do unconsciously anyway,” or at least “largely
do anyway.”11 Leiter writes that the quietism of the Legal Realists
“contrasts markedly with the normative ambitions of contemporary
jurisprudents like Ronald Dworkin” who want to “reform the[] practice
[of judges] in line with [their] . . . theor[ies] of adjudication.”12
A focus on the tort scholarship of Green and Llewellyn, however,
reveals an ambitious normative agenda, making them, in Leiter’s terms,
“nonquietists” who believed that “judges should simply adopt, openly, a
legislative role, acknowledging that . . . courts . . . make judgments on
matters of social and economic policy.”13 Contrary to what one would
expect from reading Leiter, in their tort scholarship Green and Llewllyn
resemble Dworkin precisely because they wanted to reform the practice
of judges in line with their normative theories of adjudication.14 This
Article thus confirms and extends the Legal Realism that Leiter has
presented.
That Green was a nonquietist (or, better, a reformist15) should be no
surprise. In fact, he is identified by Leiter as the “leading tort reform
scholar in America in the twentieth century.”16 Green’s proposed
reforms consisted of normative advice to courts and legislatures. Indeed,
Green laid out the policy framework, identified today as the theory of
enterprise liability, that the California Supreme Court, beginning in the
1960s, would write into law as it adopted expansive liability rules and
eliminated or limited defenses and no-duty rules that protected even
negligent defendants from liability.17 Similarly, the policy-driven
doctrine of strict products liability, a key component of the enterprise
11. Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 58–59.
12. Leiter, Classical Realism, supra note 1, at 258.
13. Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 58–59.
14. See Leiter, Classical Realism, supra note 1, at 258.
15. The term “reformist” better captures the substantive orientation of Green’s and
Llewellyn’s scholarship. See Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 229, 231 (1981). Better yet is Judge Posner’s more general term “legal
pragmatist.” A legal pragmatist believes that “judges in our system are legislators as
well as adjudicators” and that policy judgments are at the core of judicial lawmaking.
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 80, 118 (2008); see Ursin, supra note 4. Legal
pragmatists, based on their policy views, might think that judges are deciding cases in
the manner they think are correct and thus reach a quietist conclusion that it makes no
sense to give normative advice. This would explain how Leiter might describe Holmes,
a legal pragmatist, as a quietist. See Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 1, at
58–59.
16. LEITER, supra note 2, at 107–08.
17. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 567–68 (Cal. 1968) (abolishing
traditional landowner rules). See generally NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 7. In a similar
vein, Roy Brooks writes that “the imprint of legal realism can certainly be seen beyond
the 1920s and 1930s in landmark Supreme Court cases like Shelley v. Kraemer (1948)
and Brown v. Board of Education (1954).” ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING FROM LEGAL FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 89 (2d ed. 2005).
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liability theory, can be traced to Llewellyn’s famous 1930 casebook on
the law of sales.18 Thus, it turns out that Llewellyn, described by Leiter
as a quietist in the field of commercial law, was a nonquietist when it
came to tort (products liability) law. And Llewellyn, like Green, was a
prophetic nonquietist.
This Article proceeds as follows. Following this introduction, Part I
briefly sketches Leiter’s reconstructed Legal Realism. Parts II and III
then examine seminal works by Green and Llewellyn that have shaped
modern tort law. This examination reveals that each scholar believed
that judicial decisions fall into discernable patterns correlated with
underlying factual scenarios, thus confirming Leiter’s descriptive claim.
On the other hand, both Green and Llewellyn believed that courts should
adopt a legislative role, making judgments on matters of social and
economic policy. This nonquietist, reformist role would eventually lead
to courts’ reshaping tort law in accord with Green’s and Llewellyn’s views.
Part IV, the postscript, sketches the adoption by courts of the normative
(enterprise liability) agenda put forward by these giants of American
law and Legal Realism. In a forthcoming article I will seek to clarify
further the normative dimension of Legal Realism.19 I will suggest that it is
a mistake to divide Legal Realists into quietist and nonquietist camps.
This is because these terms refer to two distinct phenomena.
Nonquietism is a view of the lawmaking role: judges are legislators—
they make law, and policy plays a role in their lawmaking. Quietism
reflects a conclusion: it makes no sense to give normative advice. In the
present Article, I have continued to use these terms as Leiter uses them
so as not to confuse the analysis and because in the context of this
Article they prove adequate.
II. BRIAN LEITER’S “RECONSTRUCTED” LEGAL REALISM
Legal Realism has long been an object of scorn among legal
philosophers. Scholars, such as Ronald Dworkin, see Legal Realism as a
phenomenon of the 1920s and 1930s and claim that Realists believed
that judges actually decide cases according to their own political or moral
tastes and then choose an appropriate legal rule as a rationalization.20 In
18. LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 341–42.
19. See Edmund Ursin, Clarifying the Normative Dimension of Legal Realism: The
Example of Holmes’s The Path of the Law, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
20. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 3 (1977).

5

this, the “Received View,” judges exercise unfettered discretion, and
predicting how courts will decide cases is impossible.21 This version of
Legal Realism was, according to Leiter, rendered a “philosophical joke”
by H.L.A. Hart in the early 1960s, 22 thought by many to be “best
forgotten.”23
Leiter argues that the Legal Realism that legal philosophers would
dismiss is an inadequate, indeed misleading, description of the views of
the Legal Realists. Leiter thus has attempted a “philosophical
reconstruction” of Legal Realism in order to restore it to philosophical
respectability.24 Leiter’s reconstructed Legal Realism is linked to two
contemporary philosophical movements: naturalism and pragmatism.
“According to . . . [n]aturalism, a satisfactory theory of adjudication
must be continuous with empirical inquiry in the natural and social
sciences.”25 This approach is “skeptical about intuition-driven methods
of philosophy and conceptual analysis [and] . . . think[s] that the facts
matter for philosophy.”26 The commitment to pragmatism means that “a
satisfactory theory of adjudication for lawyers must enable lawyers to
predict what courts will do.”27 These two concepts are linked in Leiter’s
philosophical reconstruction of Legal Realism, which he calls a
naturalized jurisprudence. “To predict reliably and effectively what courts
will do,” Leiter writes, “one should know what causes courts to decide
as they do. The causes of judicial decision, in turn, are only available to
the sort of empirical inquiry modeled on the natural and social sciences
that the Realists advocate.”28 Thus, “[a] naturalistic theory of
adjudication . . . must produce a pragmatically valuable theory for
lawyers, i.e., one that will enable them to predict what courts will do.”29
In Leiter’s reconstructed Legal Realism, Realists are seen to have
offered a claim about judicial decisionmaking that was an alternative to
the legal formalist view that in deciding cases, “judges respond
primarily—indeed, perhaps exclusively—to the rational demands of the
applicable rules of law and modes of legal reasoning.”30 The core claim
of the Realists was that “[i]n deciding cases, judges react primarily to the
underlying facts of the case, rather than to applicable legal rules and
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 280.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 285.
Brian Leiter, Moral Psychology, in 2 THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORALITY:
INTUITION AND DIVERSITY 333, 333 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008).
27. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 285–86.
28. Id. at 286.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 277–78.
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reasons.”31 All Realists, according to Leiter, held this view.32 Beyond
this, however, there were fundamental disagreements.33
A. The Descriptive Theory
Leiter’s reconstruction places Realists in two camps, or wings.
A minority of Realists, like Jerome Frank, “thought that idiosyncrasies
of the judge’s personality determined the decision.”34 Leiter labels this
the “Idiosyncrasy Wing” and notes that this wing’s version of Legal
Realism would make it impossible to predict how courts will decide
cases.35 This is the source of the received view.36
According to Leiter, most Realists belonged to the “Sociological
Wing.”37 These Realists believed that judicial decisions fall into “discernible
patterns (making prediction possible), though the patterns are not those
one would expect from examining the existing legal rules.”38 Instead,
“decisions fall into patterns correlated with the underlying factual scenarios
of the disputes at issue.”39 The judicial response to the “situation type”
determines the outcome of the cases.40 Judges then “rationalize [these
outcomes] after-the-fact with appropriate legal rules and reasons.”41 In
private law especially, Leiter writes, “what courts really do is enforce
prevailing, uncodified norms as they would apply to the underlying
factual situation,” or situation type.42
In commercial law, for example, where “[Legal] Realists tend to draw
their best examples,” Realists argued that judges “either . . . enforce the
norms of the prevailing commercial culture [or] . . . try to reach the
decision that is socio-economically best under the circumstances.”43

31. Leiter, Positivism, supra note 1, at 1148.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 268–69, 279.
37. See Leiter, Positivism, supra note 1, at 1148.
38. Id.
39. Thus, for Leon Green there was “no law of torts, per se, but rather numerous
laws of torts specific to differing situation-types” such as “‘surgical operations,’ ‘keeping
of animals,’ ‘traffic and transportation,’ etc.” Id. at 1148–49.
40. Id. at 1148.
41. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 285.
42. Leiter, Positivism, supra note 1, at 1149.
43. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 281.
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Leiter gives the example of Karl Llewellyn’s analysis of a series of
New York cases in which courts appeared to have harshly “applied the
rule that a buyer who rejects the seller’s shipment by formally stating his
objections thereby waives all other objections.”44 However, “a careful
study of the facts of these cases revealed that . . . what had really
happened was that the market had fallen, and the buyer was looking to
escape the contract.”45 The waiver rule was being used by courts “‘sensitive
to commerce or to decency’ . . . to frustrate the buyer’s attempt to escape
the contract.”46 In fact, “the commercial norm—buyers ought to honor
their commitments even under changed market conditions—[was being]
enforced by the courts.”47 Lawyers sensitive to the insights of Legal
Realism could recognize that “these ‘background facts, those of
mercantile practice, those of the situation-type’ . . . determine the course
of decision.”48 This would enable them to make “predictive generalizations
about the patterns of decision[s].”49
Judges act in this manner and thus render predictably uniform
decisions, Realists suggested, because of their “sociological” profile.50
Leiter notes that Karl Llewellyn wrote that judges “respond to
traditions . . . . Tradition grips them, shapes them, limits them, guides
them.”51 Leiter writes that the Realists held that “judicial decisions are
causally determined by the relevant psycho-social facts about judges,
and at the same time judicial decisions fall into predictable patterns
because these psycho-social facts about judges—their professionalization
experiences, their backgrounds, etc.—are not idiosyncratic, but
characteristic of significant portions of the judiciary.”52
The sociological wing’s Legal Realism thus differs from the received
view in that first, the “choice of decision [is] sufficiently fettered that
prediction is possible,” and second, “these fetters upon choice [do] not
consist in idiosyncratic facts about individual judges, but rather [are] of
sufficient generality or commonality to be both accessible and to permit

44.
45.
46.

Id. at 282.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 124 (1960)).
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting LLEWELLYN, supra note 46, at 126).
49. Id. at 281.
50. Id. at 283.
51. Id. at 284 (quoting LLEWELLYN, supra note 46, at 53); see also Leiter, Legal
Realism, supra note 1, at 272.
52. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 284; see Leiter, Legal
Realism, supra note 1, at 272.
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formulating general scientific laws of the kind that make prediction
possible.”53
B. The Normative Theory
The sociological wing also advanced a normative theory of adjudication.
Some of these Realists thought that judges “should simply adopt, openly, a
legislative role, acknowledging that, because law is indeterminate, courts
must necessarily make judgments on matters of social and economic
policy.”54 Leiter writes that this nonquietist view was held by a minority
of Realists.55
Most Realists were quietists. Recall the core claim of the Realists,
that “judges respond primarily to the stimulus of the facts.”56 Consistent
with this claim, the quietist camp believed that “since the core claim
reports some irremediable fact about judging, it makes no sense to give
normative advice.”57 Leiter considers Llewellyn’s work to be the most
important example of normative quietism. Llewellyn’s normative advice to
judges in commercial disputes was to “tell judges . . . to do what . . . they
will do anyway, that is, enforce the norms of commercial culture, of the
prevailing mercantile practice.”58 Leiter sees this as “a contingent, but
still obstinate, fact about adjudication in the common-law system.”59 He
notes, however, that some Legal Realists called for “judges to do
explicitly (and perhaps more carefully) what they do unconsciously
anyway.”60 He also detects a further nonquietist normative element, or
perhaps a small nonquietist element in a generally quietist view:
[T]o the extent, however small, that judges are not fact-responsive and fairnessdriven in their decisions (to the extent, for example, that they are sometimes
formalistic or Langdellian in their mode of decision), then to that extent they
ought to decide as the core claim says most of them ordinarily do.61

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 280–81.
Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 58.
See Leiter, Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 276.
Id.
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 278.
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III. LEON GREEN’S LEGAL REALISM
In the field of torts, legal scholars best know Green today for his
theories of causation and duty,62 his emphasis on the functions of judge
and jury,63 his focus on “relational interest,”64 and his iconoclastic torts
casebook, which was first published in 1931.65 These scholars largely
overlook the fact that Green provided the intellectual foundation for what
became known by its proponents as the theory of enterprise liability.66
In fact, Green first developed the central ideas of that theory, which
embraced no-fault compensation plans as an alternative to tort (negligence)
law and proposed that courts themselves might play an important role in
reforming tort law to reflect contemporary values.
When Green came on the scene, the dominant view among judges and
scholars was that “the general notion upon which liability . . . is founded
is fault or blameworthiness.”67 In contrast, in his seminal two-part article
The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, published in 1928 and 1929,
Green launched the modern theory of enterprise liability with a scathing
critique of traditional tort theory and an ambitious agenda for substantive
tort reform.68

62.
63.
64.
65.

See LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927).
See LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930).
See generally Leon Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935).
See LEON GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORT CASES (1931); see also
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, at 87 (1986) (describing it as the
“quintessential functional casebook to be produced by a realist”).
66. See KALMAN, supra note 65, at 301–14 (failing to provide an index entry for
enterprise liability); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461,
465–70, 472–74 (1985) (failing to acknowledge the seminal role Green played in the
“invention of enterprise liability”); Allen E. Smith, Some Realism About a Grand Legal
Realist: Leon Green, 56 TEX. L. REV. 479, 499–501 (1978) (highlighting Green’s
“[three] accomplishments of which he is proudest” without mentioning his contribution
to the theory of enterprise liability: (1) the attractive nuisance doctrine, (2) “the judicial
erosion of the proximate cause doctrine,” and (3) “the development of the concept of the
relational interest of human beings as a proper subject of protection by courts”). Many
overlooked Green’s contributions because of a general misunderstanding of enterprise
liability and, specifically, the equation of enterprise liability with strict products liability,
accompanied by traditional damage awards. See generally Priest, supra. This view
overlooks the compensation plan component of the enterprise liability theory and the fact
that enterprise liability proponents urged that the expansion to strict tort liability be
accompanied by limitations on damages. See NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 7, at 106.
67. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 72 (A.B.A. 2009) (1881);
see Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401,
402–03 (1959); see also Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts,
52 HARV. L. REV. 372, 374–75 (1939); 39 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 22–23 (1939); 48 YALE
L.J. 390, 392–93 (1939) [hereinafter citing to HARV. L. REV.].
68. See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV.
1014 (1928) [hereinafter Green, The Duty Problem], reprinted in GREEN, supra note 63,
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A. Traditional Tort Theory and Legal Formalism
A classic statement of traditional tort theory is found in Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s 1881 book, The Common Law. For Holmes and subsequent
traditional theorists, it was clear that “the general notion upon which
liability . . . is founded is fault or blameworthiness.”69 Thus, in 1959 Robert
Keeton wrote that “[f]or more than a century, at least, fault has been the
principal theme of tort law.”70
These theorists saw tort law as a means to achieve justice, involving
the shifting of losses from one individual to another according to
principles of fairness. In this view, the compensation of an accident
victim, by itself, was not a sufficient reason for imposing liability: “[T]he
mere fact that one member of society is compensated when the court
shifts the loss is not such a reason, since the gain is offset by the loss shifted
to another member of society.”71 A plaintiff was thus required to provide a
justification for shifting his or her loss to the defendant, and proof of
defendant fault was seen as “the one generally acceptable reason for such
loss shifting.”72
The jurisprudential counterpart to traditional theory was legal formalism.
The descriptive claim of formalists was that “judges respond primarily—
indeed, perhaps exclusively—to . . . applicable rules of law and modes
of legal reasoning.”73 The normative view was that “judges ought to be
primarily rule- and legal-reason-responsive.”74 If a normative theory of
adjudication addresses the question of what the lawmaking role of courts
is, then the formalist answer was that courts do not make law and policy
has no role in judicial decisionmaking.
Warren Seavey, the leading tort scholar at Harvard Law School from
the 1930s to the 1950s and the Reporter for the Restatement of Torts,
was a traditional tort theorist and a formalist. Seavey’s article Mr.
Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, published in 1939 simultaneously
in the Harvard Law Review, the Columbia Law Review, and the Yale

at 38; Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 255. See generally NOLAN & URSIN,
supra note 7.
69. HOLMES, supra note 67, at 72.
70. Keeton, supra note 67, at 402.
71. Id. at 401.
72. Id. at 402.
73. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 277–78.
74. Id. at 278 n.54.
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Law Journal as part of a tribute to Justice Cardozo,75 reflects Seavey’s
view of the judicial process and arguably misstates Cardozo’s.76 Seavey
writes that Cardozo was “not primarily a reforming judge. He did not
remake the law of torts. On the contrary, by and large, he accepted the
common law as he found it, merely choosing between precedents where
choice was possible, and choosing the best.”77 Cardozo’s “power lay in
his ability to see the plan and pattern underlying the law and to make
clear the paths which had been obscured by the undergrowth of illogical
reasoning.”78 Cardozo could be praised because “he did not first decide
from some internal and unexplainable sense of justice that one of the
parties was entitled to the decision and then find or invent a formula to
fit the facts.”79 Nor did Cardozo “allow his private opinions of policy to
sway him from the lines into which the law had been moulded.”80 He,
specifically, “did not become the protector of the injured merely because
the defendant had ample funds to meet a judgment or had an ability to
spread the loss.” 81 Such considerations, for Seavey, were not only
substantively undesirable but also inappropriate even for judicial
consideration. He wrote in this vein that Cardozo’s “scales were those of
legal justice, not sentimental justice.”82 In that vein, Seavey continued,
Cardozo “used principles deduced from the cases and weighed competing
interests as had the judges who had gone before him.”83 Seavey’s view
that a more expansive role would simply be nonjudicial84 reflects the
importance that he attached to restricting the judicial lawmaking function.
Cardozo could not be accused of the heresy of “destroying [his court] as a
court of law.”85
Despite its beguiling rhetoric of fault, however, tort law in fact
consisted of a broad-ranging system of doctrines immunizing even
negligent defendants from tort liability.86 The privity requirement,

75. See supra note 67.
76. Ursin, supra note 15, at 282.
77. Seavey, supra note 67, at 372.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 373.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (Holmes, J.);
Glynn v. Cent. R.R. of N.J., 56 N.E. 698 (Mass. 1900) (Holmes, J.); Lamson v. Am. Ax
& Tool Co., 58 N.E. 585 (Mass. 1900) (Holmes, J.); McCarvel v. Sawyer, 54 N.E. 259
(Mass. 1899) (Holmes, J.). See generally Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Strict Tort
Liability of Landlords: Becker v. IRM Corp. in Context, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 142
n.116 (1986) (questioning the reinterpretation of nineteenth-century tort history offered
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which insulated negligent manufacturers from tort liability for defective
products, is illustrative. Other conspicuous examples are the traditional
landowner rules, the doctrines of charitable, governmental, and intrafamily
immunity, and the defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory
fault. Although traditional theorists ignored or downplayed these doctrines,87
maintaining that “community notions of individual blameworthiness”88
are at the core of tort law, Legal Realist tort scholars such as Leon Green
were appalled by the “harshness” of these doctrines and their “monstrous
results, both in legal theory and protection afforded particular persons.”89
B. Leon Green’s Normative (Enterprise Liability) Framework
1. Leon Green’s Duty (Policy) Factors
Green vehemently rejected the staples of traditional tort theory, declaring
that “[c]urrent legal theory . . . is wholly inadequate.”90 Scornful of “talk
about a ‘tort of negligence,’” Green wrote that “[t]his can only be intended
in a catchword sense.”91 Far from being an immutable principle rooted
in morality, negligence law in fact was an accommodation to the
emerging industrialization of the nineteenth century and was unsuited to
the conditions and values of twentieth-century America.92 In practice,
negligence law countenanced ruthless defenses93 and no-duty rules noted
for their harshness.94 Such doctrines granted classes of defendants a
preferential position against which “[e]ven the strong morality of the
negligence theory has made slow progress.”95 Particularly offensive to
Green was the immunity from liability that was given to negligent industrial
landowners in cases involving innocent child trespassers maimed on
their premises. Here the regime of traditional landowner rules “had its

by Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America:
A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981)).
87. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 67, at 63–103; Seavey, supra note 67, at 375–404.
88. Keeton, supra note 67, at 443.
89. Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 271–72 n.56, 274.
90. Id. at 276.
91. Id. at 279.
92. See id. at 255, 270.
93. Id. at 264–66.
94. Id. at 274.
95. Id. at 271.
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bloodiest toll.”96 “The cases themselves reflect . . . monstrous results, both
in legal theory and [in the] protection afforded particular persons . . . .”97
In Green’s view, the cornerstone of traditional tort theory, the “idea of
‘fault,’ . . . had become bankrupt.”98 As to the reverence given to
“principles” by traditional theorists, Green wrote that “‘principles’ are
nothing more than the generalizations (assumptions) drawn from the
factors which determined the initial judgment.”99 It followed that “these
factors having changed, the initial judgment should no longer stand.
‘Principles’ should therefore be expected to vary as do the factors which
support them.”100 Unfortunately, in Green’s view, “as a matter of fact
they lag far behind.”101 Thus, legal principles and the tort theorists who
insisted upon them were, for Green, impediments to needed legal change.
In place of traditional analysis, Green offered his own scheme for
determining both common law duties and whether compensation plans
should displace tort law in particular categories of accidents (or situation
types). In determining common law duties or whether compensation
plans should be adopted in particular situation types (or fact patterns),
Green urged a focus on five factors102: (1) the administrative factor—the
practical workability of a rule;103 (2) the moral factor—or considerations
of fault;104 (3) the economic factor—including the impact on economic
activity;105 (4) the prophylactic factor—concerned with the prevention of
future harm;106 and (5) the justice factor107—seen as “synonymous [with]
the capacity to bear the loss.”108 This last factor, which envisioned an
inquiry into loss spreading capacity as an aspect of tort theory, was truly
revolutionary and was recognized as such at the time by traditional theorists.
Francis Bohlen, for example, wrote that the “so-called ‘Justice’ factor . . .
has no place in a restatement of the existing law of the United States and
not that of Utopia. This factor has never consciously or . . . unconsciously
influenced the decision of any court.”109
96. Id. at 272.
97. Id. at 272 n.56.
98. Id. at 270.
99. Id. at 280.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 255–57.
103. Id. at 255; Green, The Duty Problem, supra note 68, at 1035.
104. Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 255.
105. Id. at 255, 274.
106. Id. at 255–57.
107. Id. at 255.
108. Calvert Magruder, Book Review, 45 HARV. L. REV. 412, 415 (1931) (reviewing
GREEN, supra note 63).
109. Francis H. Bohlen, Book Review, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 794 (1932) (reviewing
GREEN, supra note 63).

14

[VOL. 49: 1, 2012]

The Missing Normative Dimension
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

2. Workers’ Compensation Plans as a Normative “Pattern”
Unlike traditional tort theorists who viewed workers’ compensation
plans as irrelevant to tort,110 the law of employee accidents was the
cornerstone of Green’s analysis, providing “a pattern by which to indicate
other developments either mature or now under way.”111 The enactment
of workers’ compensation plans signaled that “a new order of things was
at hand” and marked a recognition that “risks of physical hurts could be
distributed as well as could wages and other costs.”112 In Green’s hands,
this recognition became the policy of “plac[ing] the loss where it will be
felt the least and can best be borne.”113 He argued that accidental injury
was not a product of moral shortcoming but the “inevitable” byproduct of
industrial society.114 Moreover, the “costs of affording . . . protection
can be cared for as part of the costs of the enterprise, and more than all, . . .
the risk when it results in hurt . . . can best be borne and absorbed” by
the enterprise.115 This insistence that the capacity to bear and distribute
a loss was a legitimate consideration in tort law injected a vital new element
into tort analysis, legitimizing the loss spreading policy that would become
central to what became known as the theory of enterprise liability.
Leon Green, Karl Llewellyn (when he wrote of tort law), and the
Legal Realist/enterprise liability scholars who followed them articulated
an ambitious nonquietist (or, better, a reformist) normative program
addressed to both legislatures and courts. Under the umbrella of what is
now known as the theory of enterprise liability, these scholars urged that
legislatures adopt no-fault compensation plans modeled after workers’
compensation plans and that courts rewrite tort law to reflect the values
of twentieth-century America by adopting expansive liability rules and
limiting or eliminating restrictive defenses and no-duty rules that
protected even negligent defendants from liability.116 For these scholars, the
choice between the legislative and common law routes was “a pragmatic
one, contingent on broader political and jurisprudential forces.”117 It was
this scholarship that spawned the three most striking developments in the
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

E.g., Warren A. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72, 86 (1942).
Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 270.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 273.
See NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 7, at 7–11.
Id. at 11.
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tort law of the past half century: the adoption by courts of the doctrine
of strict products liability, the judicial rewriting of negligence law to
eliminate or limit many no-duty rules and defenses, and the
movement for legislative enactment of no-fault auto compensation
plans.118
C. Leon Green’s Legislative Agenda: Compensation Plan Proposals
Tailored to Situation Types
Far from content with critique and theory, Green suggested both
legislative and common law strategies to achieve the goals of enterprise
liability. The clearest articulation of Green’s normative view can be seen in
his discussion of his legislative compensation plan strategy. Bearing in
mind that the same policy (duty) factors are relevant to both the legislative
and the common law agenda, it is instructive to see the far-reaching
implications of these factors by examining briefly Green’s legislative
strategy.
For Green, the workers’ compensation “pattern”119 suggested that “the
question now has come to be, not whether the negligence process should
be recognized as controlling [in specific classes of cases], but whether
[classes of cases] should not be controlled . . . by even a more rational
process for imposing responsibility.”120 This more rational process was
legislatively enacted compensation plans based on the workers’
compensation model; and Green proposed compensation plans for
general traffic cases,121 for railway crossing accidents,122 and for children
injured while trespassing on the premises of industrial landowners.123
Green intended these proposals to be suggestive, not exhaustive. He
wrote that the “possibilities are many” and that he had merely chosen
“familiar subject matters” to illustrate the “pattern [of] developments
either mature or now under way.”124 In these classes of cases “and
others not discussed . . . nothing is left to be done which cannot be better
performed by some less ponderous agency than an orthodox court.”125

118. See id. at 7–8. Llewellyn’s major work was his drafting of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, “the sales article of the most successful codification in
American Law.” Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and
the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 466 (1987).
119. Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 270.
120. Id. at 271.
121. Id. at 277–79.
122. Id. at 275–76.
123. Id. at 272–74.
124. Id. at 270.
125. Id. at 279.
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Green recognized the enormous social problem posed by automobile
accidents, which “furnish by far the largest number of cases of the
current day.”126 For Green, the Legal Realist, a heartening fact of the
law in action, as opposed to the law on the books, was that “insurance
companies are constantly absorbing the overwhelming amount of these
losses without suit, and . . . jury verdicts are little short of unanimity for
the injured party.”127 Nevertheless, the fundamental problem remained:
“Too many people . . . continue to be hurt and subjected to serious risk
without adequate protection” because of the fault requirement, which, to
Green, was a difficult and needless obstacle to victim compensation.128
He asked, “What court or group of laymen can so weigh faults as to pass
with any precision upon the conduct of two swiftly moving automobiles . . . ?
And what difference does it make if they could?”129
Concluding that “legal theory [in automobile cases] is . . . most out of
joint,”130 in 1929 Green proposed that automobile accidents should be
governed by a compensation system analogous to the workers’
compensation plans, arguing that his duty (policy) factors supported this
proposal.131 In his view, automobile accidents were inevitable, and the
“same economy is involved in compensating the hurt individual . . . as is
involved in the employer-employee cases. Insurance is the best available
protection we have against the inevitable. . . . hurts and injuries of a
motorized society.”132 Moreover, “[t]he motorist has chosen to make the
streets unsafe. . . . [and] gets the advantages”; thus, “[m]orality, economy,
and justice . . . all require the person who creates hazards on a large scale
to avail himself of the protection insurance gives in behalf of his
victims.”133 Green’s conclusion was that this litigation should be taken
from courts and given to “some less ponderous agency.”134
Green also proposed a compensation plan to govern railroad crossing
cases, and he argued that cases of child trespassers injured on industrial

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 277.
Id.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id. at 277.
See id. at 278–81.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id. at 278–79.
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property should also “be placed upon some basis of insurance similar to
the workmen’s compensation device.”135
D. Judicial Decisionmaking in Industrial Premises Cases
1. Leon Green’s Descriptive Theory
Green wrote that under basic tort doctrine a landowner “owes a trespasser
no duty other than not to intentionally harm him.”136 In other words,
landowners were immune from liability to trespassers for what, in the
absence of a no-duty rule, would be negligence. Moreover, Green wrote,
“No group of ideas has been harder set in the pronouncements of courts.”137
Yet despite this doctrinal hurdle to victim recovery for negligent behavior,
courts were able to afford relief in the situation type of persons injured
while trespassing on industrial premises.
Breaking from traditional analysis, Green rejected the “assumption
(stated in the decisions as a principle) . . . that all landowners are to be
subjected to the same responsibility.”138 In his view, special problems
arose out of a particular situation type—cases involving the “industrial
land owners.”139 Unlike the “medieval [or even contemporary] domestic
establishment with its yards and meadows . . . an entirely different sort
of enterprise [existed in] a railway yard, a steam mill, a factory, a power
system, a supply depot, an explosive storehouse, an abandoned plant, or
many other such premises.”140 In cases involving trespassers injured on
these industrial premises, courts were able to impose liability for negligence
through “a process of ‘peaceful penetration’ . . . [although] negligence
[could not] yet wear its own garb.”141
Within the industrial landowner cases, Green also believed that a
particular situation type could be singled out. This was the case of
injuries to young children, where “[t]he trespasser rule has had its
bloodiest toll.”142 In these cases the “landowner’s responsibility was
denied [at] first because the intruder himself was a wrongdoer and there
was no duty owed him.”143 Nevertheless, courts later allowed recovery.
And they rationalized their results after the fact with appropriate rules
and reasons. A majority of courts met the “wrongdoer” argument by
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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conceding “this ground but met it with a like moral argument.”144 These
courts “said that the landowner who places dangerous and attractive
machinery on his land thereby tempts young children, and his temptations
amount to invitations and having invited them into his traps, he himself
is a wrongdoer and hence responsible.”145 This was a “good result”
reached by a method “judges thought . . . necessary under their accepted
theory.”146 Indeed, this “was no small theological feat.”147
“A somewhat similar development ha[d] taken place with reference to
adults—those who walk on railway tracks or go upon the premises of
industrial plants.”148 They may choose to walk along dry railroad beds
“rather than the muddy streets of the outlying districts of large
communities.”149 Or they may choose “to satisfy their curiosities by
entering and observing the operations of industrial plants.”150 Although
their activities are not “particularly sinful . . . . they are trespassers, or
tolerated intruders at best.”151 Nevertheless, courts imposed liability for
negligence, although their “judgments [were] years in advance of their
language.”152 For example, many courts insisted that “railway[s] . . .
keep a lookout for such persons, that other landowners must warn or
protect them from hidden dangers, and must refrain from negligent
action while such persons are present.”153 The “creative power of the
courts to raise an intruder from the category of a trespasser to that of an
invitee” provided “‘bootleg’ protection.”154 The “power of judges to work
such miracles,” Green wrote, “has always been beyond the understanding of
those who would insist upon the sanctity of principles.”155 Judges were
able to “bend both principles[] and judgment . . . long before the judges
[overcame] their own habits of talking about such matters in the refined
categories of ‘fault.’”156

144.
145.
(1875)).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id. at 272–73 (footnote omitted) (citing Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id. at 274.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 274.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 275.
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Green’s description of judicial decisionmaking in the trespasser cases
thus confirms much of Leiter’s claim about the sociological wing of the
Legal Realists. In conformity with that claim, Green found that judicial
decisions favorable to plaintiffs fell into discernable patterns, though not
those one would predict from basic tort doctrine,157 that is, the rule that a
landowner owes a trespasser no duty other than not to intentionally harm
him. Instead, as Leiter puts it, “[J]udicial decisions fall into (sociologically)
determined patterns, in which . . . judges reach results based on a (generally
shared) response to the underlying facts of the case which . . . they then
rationalize after-the-fact with appropriate legal rules and reasons.”158
These were the rules that allowed a negligence cause of action for young
children injured by dangerous and attractive machinery on industrial
property (which evolved into the child trespasser rule) and rules that in
cases of adult trespassers on industrial property required railways to keep
a lookout for such persons and other industrial landowners to warn or
protect them from hidden dangers and refrain from negligent action while
such persons were present.
In these industrial trespasser cases, judicial decisions rationalizing plaintiff
recovery after the fact with legal rules were responding, in Leiter’s
terms, to uncodified norms. These norms, however, were not those of
the commercial culture. In Green’s view, the uncodified norms that courts
enforced in these cases were those that he articulated in his policy (duty)
factors. Green wrote that the ability of industrial enterprises, such as
railroads and factories, “to reduce the risks of hurt even as to those who
insist upon subjecting themselves to such risks, is sufficient to warrant
judgment for plaintiffs in many of these cases.”159 Moreover, “the costs
of affording such protection can be cared for as part of the costs of the
enterprise.”160 And “more than all, . . . the risk when it results . . . can best
be borne and absorbed by this type of landowner.”161 Summarizing the
application of his duty factors to child trespasser cases, Green wrote that
“[e]very consideration of economics, of ethics, of prevention, and of
justice would all place a severe duty upon the landowner in such
cases.”162 It was in response to the uncodified social norms represented
by these policy factors that courts allowed tort causes of action for persons
157. See Leiter, Positivism, supra note 1, at 1148. It should be noted, however, that
Green might nevertheless agree with Judge Posner’s statement that many judicial
decisions, though not the most important ones in terms of the development of legal
doctrine or the impact on society, are responsive to legal rules. POSNER, supra note 15,
at 8. This would be especially true of decisions unfavorable to plaintiffs.
158. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 285.
159. Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 274.
160. Id. at 273.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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injured while trespassing on industrial premises. These results were then
rationalized after the fact with legal rules and reasons. Courts had found,
for example, that “temptations amount to invitations”163 and that industrial
landowners had a duty to “warn or protect [intruders] from hidden
dangers.”164 This “‘bootleg’ protection”165 reached a “good result”166 by
a method “judges thought . . . necessary under their accepted theory.”167
2. A Note on Prediction
Leiter writes that a naturalistic theory of adjudication “must enable
lawyers to predict what courts will do.”168 That is a pretty tall order,
given that a primary focus of the Legal Realists was on appellate cases,169
which by definition are those that present the most difficult issues. As
Green pointed out, “[T]he process in negligence cases, of all the patterns
of the judicial process, is least fixed and most flexible.”170 As a result,
“[n]o aggregate of scholars or judges or practitioners can anticipate its
judgment with assurance in a single complex case.”171 Moreover, even
courts that responded to situation types too often clung to outmoded
doctrines, leading to either “the confusion or the bad habits resulting
from carrying along these phrases which misrepresent everything that is
being done.”172 So the predictive power of Green’s Legal Realism
should not be overstated with respect to individual cases.
But Leiter has offered an alternative version of the predictive power of
Legal Realist insights: the Realist perspective should allow lawyers to
make “predictive generalizations about patterns of decision[s].”173 And
this, indeed, is what Green was offering in his analysis of the industrial
premises cases. Adapting what Leiter characterizes as the “‘central tenet’ of
the Realist Movement” to the tort context, we see Green’s demonstration
that “judges’ decisions arise not merely from the rules they state in their

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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Id. at 274.
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Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 286.
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Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 281.
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opinions, but at least as much from unstated reasons”174—from the
situation type and underlying policy considerations.
Moreover, in assessing the predictive power of the Realist perspective,
we can ask, “Compared to what?” The alternative to Legal Realism, it
will be recalled, was legal formalism, the view that “judges respond
primarily—indeed, perhaps exclusively—to the rational demands of the
applicable rules of law and modes of legal reasoning.”175 The “‘bootleg’
protection”176 that courts were affording in industrial premises cases
would mystify the formalist. As Green wrote, the “power of judges to
work such miracles has always been beyond the understanding” of those
who started with the “assumption (stated in the decisions as a principle) . . .
that all landowners are to be subjected to the same responsibility” and
who “would insist upon the sanctity of principles.”177
So prediction would not be perfect for the Legal Realist. But the
predictive power of Legal Realism would be better than that of formalism.
And prediction would be improved for the Realist who understood a
Realist-related insight that the lawyer needs to know the type of court
that is deciding the case. One needs to recognize that there are “court
types” as well as “situation types,” and one also needs to understand the
ideological makeup of the court and its willingness to adapt to the “new
order of things”178 by abandoning or adapting traditional formalistic
doctrine. Previous decisions of the court, as lawyers know, are a guide
to prediction by a lawyer who knows the importance of both situation
type and court type.
3. Leon Green’s Normative (Reformist) Theory of Judicial
Decisionmaking
The main thrust of Green’s writing was normative. As he noted, the
accommodations made for child trespassers on industrial property were
made by a majority of courts, and many courts had also made
accommodations for adults. Green’s approval of the “good result”
reached by affording such “bootleg protection” can be seen as implicit
normative advice that lagging courts should move in this direction. In
Leiter’s terms:

174. Id. at 275–76 n.40 (quoting James J. White, The Influence of American Legal
Realism on Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, in PRESCRIPTIVE FORMALITY AND
NORMATIVE RATIONALITY IN MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS 401, 401 (Werner Krawietz et al.
eds., 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Id. at 277–78.
176. Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 274.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 270.
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[T]o the extent, however small, that judges are not fact-responsive and fairnessdriven in their decisions (to the extent, for example, that they are sometimes
formalistic or Langdellian in their mode of decision), then to that extent they
ought to decide as the core claim says most of them ordinarily do.179

If this had been the extent of Green’s normative advice, he might be
seen as adding a small nonquietist element to an otherwise quietist
jurisprudence. But Green believed that courts should follow what most
courts were doing because of his policy factors—and he had bigger fish
to fry.
Green, for example, went beyond proposing that lagging courts respond
to his policy factors by joining the majority of courts in extending
bootleg protection to adult trespassers. Noting that the judgments of
courts “are years in advance of their language,” Green wrote that “[t]he
judicial process does not require either the confusion or the bad habits
resulting from carrying along these phrases which misrepresent everything
that is being done.”180 In his view the “normal negligence formula of
‘reasonable care under all the circumstances’ was designed for just these
cases in which judgment must have the widest range and in which
uniformity, except in process, is impossible.”181 Green thus urged that
courts, based on his policy factors, do what no court had done or would
do for decades: hold that landowners owe a full duty of care to adult (and
presumably child) trespassers—and presumably licensees—on industrial
property. Four decades later, the California Supreme Court would write
policy factors derived from Green into law in its landmark decision in
Rowland v. Christian, which abolished the traditional landowner rules.182
E. Beyond Negligence Law: Endorsing and Extending
Rylands-Style Strict Liability Rules
Green’s normative agenda, moreover, extended beyond reforms within
the negligence system. Contrary to traditional theorists who viewed the
strict liability rule of Rylands v. Fletcher183 as “misguided,”184 Green
suggested that courts might adopt strict liability rules, which could
simplify litigation and assure compensation. Green wrote that “it is not
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Leiter, Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 278.
Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 275.
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See infra notes 279–81 and accompanying text.
Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.).
Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 282.

23

always necessary that courts await legislation to relieve them of the glut
of cases which their own process has brought upon them.”185 Judges, for
example, “were not helpless in reducing to a simple basis the responsibility
of the keeper of wild animals for the hurts done by them.”186 Similarly,
the “extreme use of power in Rylands v. Fletcher was not as misguided
as sometimes thought.”187 Indeed, Green approved of a 1928 California
Supreme Court decision, Green v. General Petroleum Corp.,188 that
applied strict liability to a defendant whose oil well had blown out while
being drilled with due care. The California court “properly ignored the
commitment it had made doctrinally [rejecting Rylands in previous
cases] and decided the case on a broader basis.”189 Although Green did
not pursue the matter, the application of strict liability to oil wells would
inevitably suggest broader applications of strict liability.190
The far-reaching implications of Green’s policy-based approach to tort
doctrine can be seen in a two-part article published in 1929 and 1930 by
Lester Feezer and “prepared under the direction of Dean Leon Green.”191
Elaborating on Green’s position that courts and legislatures could
legitimately decide to “place the loss where it will be felt the least and
can best be borne,”192 Feezer wrote:
[A] guiding principle as to who can best bear loss . . . would seem to be that it is
the party who can absorb it with the least injury to himself and in such a way as
will produce a minimum of consequential problems of social adjustment for
himself or his dependents.193

Furthermore, he argued that placing a loss on a defendant was the
beginning, not the end, of the analysis. “The defendant upon whom is
placed the burden of a money loss in a tort action may distribute the loss
by insurance or by adding it to the cost of carrying on his business; in
either case it is distributed ultimately upon society.”194 From this
perspective Feezer regarded workers’ compensation as the “great
outstanding step in the process of shifting loss arising from personal

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Green v. Gen. Petrol. Corp., 270 P. 952, 955 (Cal. 1928).
189. Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 282 n.71.
190. See, e.g., Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1948) (discussing strict
liability in regard to fumigation).
191. L.W. Feezer, Capacity To Bear the Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain
Types of Tort Cases (pts. 1 & 2), 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 805 (1930), 79 U. PA. L. REV.
742, 742 n.1 (1931).
192. Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 256.
193. Feezer, supra note 191, pt. 1, at 809.
194. Id. at 809–10.
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injury,”195 and he followed Green’s lead with a proposal for an automobile
compensation plan.
More provocative was Feezer’s proposal that courts adopt a strict
liability rule in a specific class of products cases. Feezer’s strict liability
proposal was tailored to the specific product to which Green had pointed
as the single most important source of injuries of the time—the
automobile.196 Feezer did not focus on manufacturer liability, and the
law of implied warranty was not a source of his proposed strict products
liability rules. Instead, he built on Rylands v. Fletcher.
Noting that “[e]vidences of a tendency to shift and distribute the loss
are appearing from time to time in diverse forms” and that this “tendency
may take the form of a greater development of liability without fault,”
Feezer suggested that courts might apply strict liability rules to vehicle
operators by building on Rylands v. Fletcher.197
The courts may find it just as easy to place a legal responsibility upon the man
who brings a dangerous force upon the highway, in the form of an automobile
weighing thousands of pounds and capable of going eighty miles per hour, to
keep it under control at his peril, as to fix this degree of responsibility upon the
man who brings upon his land a substance which, if it escapes from his control,
turns into a dangerous force.198

This proposal was, of course, an extension of Green’s 1929 endorsement
of strict liability rules that built on Rylands v. Fletcher.199 If courts had
accepted Feezer’s view, the stage would have been set for the judicial
creation of a sweeping enterprise liability. Beyond automobiles loomed
other enterprises and activities wherein the application of strict liability
would serve the policies of the enterprise liability theory.
IV. KARL LLEWELLYN’S TORT (PRODUCTS LIABILITY)
LEGAL REALISM
Although Green had recognized that courts might expand the reach of
Rylands-style strict liability rules, his focus on “tort” law meant that he
neglected an existing body of strict liability rules. These were the strict
liability rules that courts were employing in products cases under the law
of sales, specifically the warranty doctrines that permitted courts to
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 814.
See id. at 812–14.
Id. at 813.
Id.
Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 282–83.
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impose strict liability in cases of injury caused by food products.200 It
was out of these warranty decisions that the modern law of strict products
liability grew and an aggressive common law strategy developed.201 The
seminal scholar was Karl Llewellyn, who addressed the issue of products
liability in his 1930 casebook on the law of sales and in a 1936 article.202
Llewellyn was to the law of contract and sales what Green was to tort,
a visionary prophet who, beginning in the 1920s, used the insights of
Legal Realism203 to debunk the methodology and policies of traditional
theorists.204 In Llewellyn’s view, the 1906 Uniform Sales Act was out
of date, “failing to relate meaningfully to the demands and complexities
of modern commercial relations.”205 Llewellyn also believed the 1906
Act “embodied an obsolete form of law—consisting of rules derived
from a few broad abstractions, removed from practical experience, and
expected to answer all questions.”206 Llewellyn’s critique of sales law,
in short, paralleled Green’s critique of tort law. And in 1930, shortly
after Green published his Duty Problem articles, “Llewellyn published
his first major work criticizing [Williston’s Uniform Sales Act] as illsuited to sales transactions.”207 That work, Llewellyn’s famous casebook
on sales,208 began his lifelong venture into the modernization of sales
law, which ultimately reached fruition in the 1960s with Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, “the sales article of the most successful
codification in American law.”209 Less well known is that Llewellyn’s
casebook made a contribution of fundamental importance to the substance
and strategy of enterprise liability.210

200. For an early account of the application by courts of strict liability in food
cases, see Rollin M. Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability (pts. 1 & 2),
5 IOWA L. BULL. 6, 86 (1919–1920).
201. For an excellent account of Llewellyn’s contribution to the enterprise liability
theory, on which I draw, see John B. Clutterbuck, Note, Karl Llewellyn and the
Intellectual Foundations of Enterprise Liability Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 1131, 1136 (1988).
202. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 341–42; Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 704 n.14;
see also K.N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions upon Economics, 15 AM. ECON.
REV. 665, 680–81 (1925) (providing early presentation of related views). For a detailed
account of Llewellyn’s contribution to the development of strict products liability, see
Clutterbuck, supra note 201. See also Ursin, supra note 15, at 288 n.382.
203. See KALMAN, supra note 65; WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE
REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
204. For an excellent discussion of Llewellyn’s sales scholarship, on which I draw,
see Wiseman, supra note 118, at 472–73.
205. Id. at 472.
206. Id. at 473.
207. Id. at 475.
208. LLEWELLYN, supra note 7.
209. Wiseman, supra note 118, at 466.
210. See Clutterbuck, supra note 201; see also Ursin, supra note 15, at 288 n.382.
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A. Karl Llewellyn’s Descriptive Theory: Strict Products Liability
Examining the situation type of product injuries, Llewellyn found that
judicial decisions had fallen into patterns, but not the patterns one would
predict from orthodox legal doctrines.211 In tort law, cases that formerly
would have resulted in summary judgment for a product manufacturer or
seller no longer were being so decided. Llewellyn wrote that this change
could not be understood if one focused on tort law “in theory: ‘one
responds for fault.’”212 Rather, attention had to be paid to the “actual
decisions,” which had shown “the tendency to constantly raise the degree of
care required, and to constantly decrease the extent of proof required to
get to the jury—leaving the jury to do the rest.”213 This was “tort [law]
in action: given res ipsa loquitor, what do juries do?”214
The new element in Llewellyn’s analysis was a second line of cases
that had escaped the focus of tort scholars. These were the warranty
decisions that, in the case of food products, had resulted in consumer
recovery on a strict liability theory.215 In this situation type, warranty
law was “being stretched . . . to fit . . . a need . . . which the historical
limitations of the warranty concept [such as the privity limitation] make
it inadequate to cover.”216 But when a “court proclaims a ‘warranty’ and
therefore a recovery,” Llewellyn suggested that it is not “a case of
‘warranty’ as we know it in mercantile sales law [but rather] a technical
excuse for shifting a risk which seems to call for shifting.”217
Courts in products liability cases were deciding cases in a manner
favorable to plaintiffs and rationalizing these results with available legal
materials.218 As Llewellyn explained, “How could case-law grow, without
technical defects? You cannot both really follow, and get results, at
once. Since you have to seem to follow, and also have to get results,
almost every advance is at the price of fudging your logic.”219
Courts in these cases were responding to uncodified norms, but these
norms were not those of the commercial culture.220 And Llewellyn’s
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See Leiter, Positivism, supra note 1, at 1147–48.
Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 704 n.14.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 342.
Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 704 n.14.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 342.
Id. at 343.
Id.
See id. at 342.
Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 705 n.14.
See LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 342.
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discussion of these norms reveals his normative theory of adjudication.221
Llewellyn, in the context of products cases, in fact held normative and
substantive views that mirrored the views of Leon Green, and he was no
quietist.
B. Karl Llewellyn’s Normative Theory
1. Policies
The “tendencies toward . . . which [these cases were] driving” was
indicated by what Llewelyn called the “ideal picture.”222 “If judges were
legislators, and felt free of precedent, . . . if the courts were given to
viewing social policy as a whole, rather than the particular case before
them, . . . the goal of the development would in its main outlines have
been clear.”223 The “needed protection,” Llewellyn wrote, “is twofold:
to shift the immediate incidence of the hazard of life in an industrial
society away from the individual over to a group which can distribute
the loss; and to place the loss where the most pressure will be exerted to
keep down future losses.”224 These twin policies of creating incentives
for safety and distributing accident losses mirror two of Green’s
duty/policy factors: the “prophylactic factor” concerned with prevention
of future harm and the “justice factor”—which was seen as “synonymous
[with] the capacity to bear the loss.”225 (And they would become the
policy justification Justice Traynor would offer for his proposal for strict
products liability in his 1944 concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co.226) Llewellyn wrote that “it is desired to [provide this
twofold protection] in the quickest, least expensive . . . way.”227

221. See Wiseman, supra note 118, at 472.
222. LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 342.
223. Id. at 341.
224. Id. In 1920 Rollin M. Perkins, in supporting application of strict liability in
food cases, had seen such liability as “stimulating such great care that the injury will be
avoided.” Perkins, supra note 200, pt. 2, at 110. And in 1924 Edwin W. Patterson
suggested that the warranty doctrine applied in food cases should be analyzed in terms of
risk bearing. Edwin W. Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal
Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 335, 357–59 (1924). Patterson was concerned that the
“theory of contracts” posed privity barriers to recovery from manufacturers by injured
consumers. Id. at 358. “[O]nly by some violent pounding and twisting can the [warranty]
concept be made to yield the result called for by considerations of economic and social
policy.” Id. Thus, Patterson asked, “Would it not simplify matters to state the rules as
one of . . . risk-bearing?” Id.
225. Magruder, supra note 108, at 415.
226. 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
227. LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 341.
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2. Karl Llewellyn’s Normative Advice to Legislatures
In the context of this “ideal picture,”228 Llewellyn offered normative
advice based on his twofold policies. Strict liability should be imposed
on manufacturers who are “equipped to spread, and indeed to reduce,
risks.” 229 “The first group liable, to any consumer, should be the
manufacturer. . . . The consumer, barring his own fault in use, should
have no negligence to prove; that the article was not up to its normal
character should be enough.”230 Under this approach, “the first point of
loss infliction would be [the manufacturer,] a party best able to prevent a
similar loss.”231 But “the loss would lie ultimately where it belongs, on
the consumers of the article concerned en masse, in competition with
other articles each carrying its own true costs in human life and effort.”232
This was the “ideal picture,” and Llewellyn wrote that it was “time for
legislation,”233 presumably to enact this broad rule of strict products
liability. Llewellyn did not elaborate on this terse suggestion in his 1930
casebook, but he took steps to see it implemented a few years later.
By the 1930s, it had become apparent that the Uniform Sales Act was
unsuited to a modern industrial society. Llewellyn called the Uniform
Sales Act a “rebuilt machine,”234 and in “the 1930s . . . . lawyers, scholars,
and merchants reached a consensus . . . that the Uniform Sales Act of
1906 was obsolete.”235 As a consequence, Llewellyn and others began to
contemplate the possibility of replacing the “rebuilt machine” of the
Uniform Sales Act with a new creation, which would eventually become
the Uniform Commercial Code.236
Llewellyn contemplated that the law of products liability would be
part of the new Code and that this would give him the opportunity, as
part of a comprehensive reform of the law of sales, to incorporate a strict
liability provision that would serve the goals of accident prevention and
loss spreading. How much this idea deviated from the prevailing norms
of the commercial culture was soon made crystal clear. In 1940 and 1941,
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Llewellyn proposed, as part of his new law of sales, a manufacturer’s
implied warranty of freedom from dangerous defects. This warranty
would impose an “absolute liability . . . on manufacturers for injury ‘in
person or property’ incurred by anyone ‘in the ordinary course of use or
consumption . . . by reason of defect’ in the goods.”237
Llewellyn’s proposed sales law was considered in the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws beginning in
1940.238 Merchants’ representatives voiced such strong opposition at the
1941 conference that Llewellyn dropped the warranty provision entirely.
Asked about the deletion at the 1943 meeting, “Llewellyn replied that
‘every time we tried to draw’ the rule, it ‘scare[d] everybody that saw it
pea green.’”239 In this initial skirmish between the norms of commercial
culture and the enterprise policies of loss spreading and accident prevention,
the commercial culture prevailed.
3. Karl Llewellyn’s Normative Theory of Judicial Decisionmaking in
Products Liability Cases
Recall that Leiter considers Llewellyn’s commercial law scholarship
an example of normative quietism. Llewellyn’s normative advice to
judges in commercial disputes was to “tell judges that they ought to do
what it is they [would] do anyway, that is, enforce the norms of commercial
culture, of the prevailing mercantile practice.”240 Leiter detects a further
nonquietist element: “[T]o the extent, however small, that judges are not
fact-responsive and fairness-driven . . . then to that extent they ought to
decide as the core claim says most of them ordinarily do.”241 In contrast,
nonquietists such as Felix Cohen believed courts should examine realworld facts about a particular situation type, assess “economic,
sociological, political, or ethical questions,” and then “formulate [a]
rule.”242
In the field of products liability, not all courts were imposing strict
liability in food cases. Thus, Llewellyn can be seen as offering implicit
normative advice to courts that were “hampered in their vision”;243 they
should join the trend of the warranty line of decisions that, by “fudging
[their] logic,”244 had allowed recovery in food cases and that “wax[ed]
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
See id. at 490.
Id. at 523–24 n.255 (alteration in original).
Leiter, Legal Realism, supra note 1, at 277.
Id. at 278.
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810 (1935).
243. LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 342.
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great by way of glass in beverages or bread, and poisonous meat.”245
One might characterize this as a small element of nonquietism. But that
would be a mistake. Llewellyn believed that courts should join this
trend because a strict liability rule would serve the goals of distributing
losses and exerting pressure to keep down future losses—because of
reasons of social policy that clashed with the prevailing norms of
commercial culture. Moreover, Llewellyn did not see this development
as “confined to [the food cases], its center. It spreads to cover other
hazards to consumers.”246 And Llewellyn’s “ideal picture” of a broad
strict liability doctrine indicated “a set of tendencies toward . . . which
[the cases were] driving.”247
The nonquietist implications of Llewellyn’s analysis can be seen in a
1938 article by Lester Feezer.248 As previously discussed, Feezer’s
provocative 1931 discussion of products liability had not focused on
manufacturer or dealer liability nor had Feezer suggested or mentioned
the law of warranty as a source of strict liability rules.249 In an article
published seven years later, however, Feezer’s thinking once again had
been transformed, this time by Llewellyn. Feezer incorporated in quotation
form two pages of material from Llewellyn’s 1930 casebook, writing
that “Professor Llewellyn has outlined the situation.”250 Following
Llewellyn’s lead, Feezer wrote that the food cases “furnish[ed] a convenient
stepping stone for the inclusion of other manufactured articles in the
same category.”251 Building on this case law, Feezer “suggest[ed] the
possibility that makers of all sorts of products [would] be held
responsible . . . without showing negligence.”252 Such a rule would fulfill
the policy of placing the burden “where it can be best distributed.”253 In
the years that followed, other enterprise liability scholars and,
importantly, Justice Traynor would also take their cue from Llewellyn in
suggesting judicial adoption of strict liability rules to cope with the
problem of injuries caused by defective products.

245. LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 342.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See Lester W. Feezer, Manufacturer’s Liability for Injuries Caused by His
Products: Defective Automobiles, 37 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1938).
249. See Feezer, supra note 191, pt. 1.
250. Feezer, supra note 248, at 5–6.
251. Id. at 10–11.
252. Id. at 26.
253. Id. at 24.
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V. POSTSCRIPT: LEGAL REALIST (ENTERPRISE LIABILITY)
SUCCESSES IN COURTS
A. Strict Products Liability
Llewellyn’s (and Feezer’s) proposal for strict products liability was
picked up by Prosser in his 1941 treatise and then, importantly, by
Justice Traynor in his 1944 concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co.254 In that opinion, Traynor urged that persons injured by
defective products should not have to prove negligence; a strict liability
rule should govern.255 In sharp contrast to Seavey-like formalists,
Traynor’s stance was that the policy of loss distribution and the fact of
insurance were not simply legitimate but of central importance in
judicial lawmaking. Traynor wrote that the “cost of an injury and the
loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person
injured.”256 This misfortune, however, is “a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business.”257 Traynor also emphasized that
strict liability should be imposed in order to create incentives for safety,
writing that “public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it
will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in
defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer
can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others,
as the public cannot.”258
The Escola concurrence used the insights and techniques of the
Realists: it looked behind the formality of legal rules, inquired how rules
“really work,” and examined both the historical bases of existing legal
rules and the real world in which these rules must operate. Justice Traynor
wrote that traditional products liability rules were the outgrowth of a
different era: “[H]andicrafts have been replaced by mass production with
its great markets and transportation facilities, [and] the close relationship
between the producer and consumer of a product has been altered.”259
Consequently, the “manufacturer’s obligation to the consumer must keep
pace with the changing relationship between them.”260
Moreover, Justice Traynor emphasized that when one moved beyond a
mere acceptance of the verbal formulas of legal doctrines, it became
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apparent that strict liability was not far from the law as it existed even in
1944. In cases of injuries caused by defective food products, courts had
granted plaintiffs using warranty law a strict liability recovery against
manufacturers of defective food products. Those courts had “resorted to
various fictions to rationalize the extension of the manufacturer’s warranty
to the consumer.”261 Recognizing the desirability of the results reached
through these fictions, Traynor was ready to discard the fictions and
openly embrace a rule of strict manufacturing liability.262 Justice Traynor’s
analysis of negligence law was similar. He recognized that courts had
“held the manufacturer[s] liable on a mere fiction of negligence.”263
He also recognized that courts left to juries the decision “whether the
inference of [negligence had] been dispelled, regardless of the evidence
against . . . negligence.”264 In doing so, the reality was that “the negligence
rule approaches the rule of strict liability.”265 Justice Traynor concluded
that “[i]f public policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be
responsible for their quality regardless of negligence there is no reason
not to fix that responsibility openly.”266
Justice Traynor’s Escola proposal for judicial adoption of strict
products liability was “heresy to formalists of the 1940s and 1950s.”267
And it, “as well as its controversial loss spreading policy, violated 1950s
legal process norms of ‘neutrality’ and ‘reasoned elaboration.’”268 Both
the strict liability doctrine and its underlying policies, however, were
written into California law beginning in the 1960s with Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.269 Based on these policies, the California
Supreme Court, with little hesitation, extended strict liability beyond
manufacturers to include retailers, 270 wholesalers, 271 and lessors.272
These rulings, which quickly were followed by courts across the nation,
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represented, according to Prosser, “the most rapid and altogether spectacular
overturn of an established rule in the entire history of the law of torts.”273
B. Negligence Law and Duty
The Legal Realists’ normative agenda met with similar success within
negligence law. Leon Green, it will be recalled, had proposed that
policy, or “duty,” factors should replace traditional analysis to determine
liability and duty rules.274 One of these, the “justice factor,”275 or “the
capacity to bear the loss,”276 was said at the time by critics to have
“no place in a restatement of the existing law of the United States and
not that of Utopia.”277 This factor was said to have “never consciously
or . . . unconsciously influenced the decision of any court.”278 In 1968,
the California Supreme Court, in its landmark decision in Rowland v.
Christian, wrote policy factors that can be traced to Green into
California tort law as it discarded the traditional landowner rules in favor
of a general duty of due care.279 In deciding whether to retain, discard,
or modify traditional no-duty rules in the future, the court would
consider
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the
policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for
the risk involved.280

273. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 97, at 654 (4th ed.
1971).
274. Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 255–57.
275. Id. at 255–56.
276. See Magruder, supra note 108, at 415.
277. Bohlen, supra note 109, at 794.
278. See id.
279. 443 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968). Rowland adopted and augmented factors first
articulated by the court in Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1957). Biakanja, in
turn, drew on and augmented factors found in Prosser’s hornbook, see PROSSER, supra
note 273, § 36, at 168, 172 (2d ed. 1955), and the Harper and James treatise, see FOWLER
V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 1052 (1956). Prosser’s
factors were an adaptation of the duty factors Green had articulated in his Duty Problem
articles.
280. 443 P.2d at 564 (emphasis added). Rowland’s considerations for determining
duty reflect Green’s duty factors. Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note 7, at 255–57;
see supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text. Rowland’s moral blame factor, of course,
directly reflects Green’s moral factor, but the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff and
the closeness of connection between the defendant’s conduct and injury suffered may
also be seen to reflect this factor. Rowland’s policy of preventing future harm is linked
to Green’s prophylactic factor, and Rowland’s focus on the availability, cost, and prevalence
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The “fundamental principle,” the court wrote, is that liability generally
should be imposed “for an injury occasioned to another by [a] want of
ordinary care or skill.”281
Just as in the case of its landmark strict products liability rulings, so
too the California Supreme Court’s approach to duty has proved influential
with the nation’s courts, as illustrated by the Restatement (Third) of
Torts.282 Like California, the Third Restatement adopts a default rule
that defendants owe a duty of reasonable care to avoid physical injury.283
Also, like California, the determination that a no-duty rule should be
adopted is a determination of policy or, in the words of the Restatement,
“[a] principle or policy which warrants denying or limiting liability.”284
Although the Restatement declines to delineate factors to assist in this
policy determination, a substantial number of states have followed Rowland
in this regard, and half the nation’s courts have followed Rowland in
establishing a unitary standard of care in premises cases, at least with
respect to invitees and licensees.285

of insurance reflects Green’s justice factor, which encompasses “plac[ing] the loss where
it will be felt the least and can best be borne.” Green, The Duty Problem: II, supra note
7, at 256. Likewise, Rowland’s consideration of the burden on the defendant and the
consequences to the community is linked to Green’s economic factor and his
consideration of the impact on economic activity.
Rowland’s duty factors would provide the framework for California decisions
expanding the concept of duty in later years, and with a more conservative court in the
past quarter century, they also provided the framework for cutting back liability.
Compare Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658–59 (Cal. 1985)
(emphasizing foreseeability and expanding landowner duty to protect against crime by
third parties), with Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 214–15 (Cal.
1993) (limiting Isaacs).
281. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 563.
282. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7 (2005).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See W. Jonathon Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
671, 676 n.27 (2008) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 reporters’ note to cmt. a (Council Draft No. 7, 2007)).
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